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Norman M. Fera* Comment on Jacmain v.
Attorney General of Canada
and the P.S.S.R. Board
The recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Jacmain v. A. G.
of Can. and the P.S.S.R. Board' partly clarifies the rights and
"protections" accorded a federal government probationary worker
upon dismissal. Regretably, however, with reference to the role of a
grievance adjudicator (a federal tribunal) in such matters, and even
more so with reference to the role of the courts in "supervising" the
jurisdictional findings of such a tribunal, the Jacmain decision is
less instructive.
The facts of the case are relatively complex. Jacmain had been an
employee with the Department of National Revenue prior to
entering a competition with the Office of the Commissioner of
Official Languages. In May 1973 he was appointed to the
Complaints Branch of that Office but about nine months later he
was notified in writing2 by the Commissioner of Official Languages
that he would be rejected during his probationary period3 pursuant
to the provisions of the Public Service Employment Act. 4 Under
s.285 of that Act, the deputy head is authorized, at any time during a
probationary period, 6 to give notice to the employee and the Public
Service Commission that he intends to reject the probationer for
*B.A. (Laur.) Teach. Lic. (Ont.),
B.A., M.A. (Carelton), LL.B. (U. of 0.).
1. Case unreported at time of writing. Judgment was rendered September 30,
1977. [Now reported as [ 1978] 2 S.C.R. 15 ed.]
2. Prior to the receipt of that letter, on October 23, 1973, the Commissioner of
Official Languages informed Mr. Jacmain of the former's intention to reject him.
3. During the probationary period, Mr. Jacmain was Chief of Division in the
Complaints Branch of the Office of Official Languages.
4. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32
5. Section 28(3) of the Public Service Employment Act provides:
(3) The deputy head may, at any time during the probationary period, give
notice to the employee and to the Commissioner that he intends to reject the
employee for cause at the end of such notice period as the Commission may
establish for any employee or class or employees and, unless the Commission
appoints the employee to another position in the Public Service before the end of
the notice period applicable in the case of the employee, he ceases to be an
employee at the end of that period.
6. It was not contested that the notice of rejection of February 25, 1974 was within
Jacmain's probationary period.
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cause at the end of the notice period. 7 That same section requires the
deputy head to furnish to the Public Service' Commission reasons
for his intention to reject the employee during his probation. 8
Purportedly in accordance with that requirement, the employer
notified the Commission in writing that during the probationary
period Mr. Jacmain "was not able to fulfil a function" 9 in the
Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages.
Immediately upon receiving his notice of termination, 10 Mr.
Jacmain instituted a grievance" on the basis that he was, in fact,
being dismissed from his position with no reasons having been
given and that the action of the employer was in truth a disciplinary
discharge.' 2 The employer, of course, answered that allegation
7. That period is established by the Public Service Commission for any employee
or class of employees. See s.28(3) of the Public Service Employment Act, supra,
note 5.
8. See s.28(4) of the Public Service Employment Act, supra, note 4
9. The nature of the function Jacmain was unable to fulfil to the satisfaction of the
Commission was not stated. Under s. 18(4) of the Public Service Employment Act,
supra, note 4, a deputy head who gives notice that he intends to reject an employee
for cause must also furnish the Public Service Commission with reasons for such
rejection.
10. The terms "termination", "dismissal" or "severance" will be used
throughout the paper in a general sense to refer to termination of employment for
whatever reason - rejection for cause or disciplinary discharge or release by the
Civil Service Commission under s.31 of the Public Service Employment Act,
supra, note 4.
In this paper, the word "rejection" or a form of it is reserved to refer to "rejection
for cause during a probationary period" under the terms of the Public Service
Employment Act, supra, note 4, and the word "discharge" or a form of it is
reserved to refer to disciplinary discharge under the Public Service Staff Relations
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35.
Unfortunately, and this point is underlined, as used by the Adjudicator (a federal
tribunal), the Public Service Staff Relations Board (both authorized by the Public
Service Staff Relations Act) and the courts, those words are not so reserved.
Accordingly, when reading any of the decisions or judgments rendered by those
tribunals, the context in which the term is used must be carefully considered.
11. Where the grievance of an employee is with respect to disciplinary action
resulting in discharge, s.91(1) (b) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act entitles
the employee to refer the grievance to adjudication. Where, however, a
probationary employee ceases to be an employee because of rejection for cause,
pursuant to s.28(3) of the Public Service Employment Act, he has no right to refer
the matter to adjudication.
Also, a probationary worker rejected for cause has a right to grieve under s.90 of
the Public Service Staff Relations Act. Jacmain's grievance was considered under
s.90 and rejected. However, it appears that not all grievors under s.90 are entitled
to adjudication under s.91.
12. It should be noted here that just before issuing a notice of rejection, the
Commissioner of Official Languages had imposed a five day suspension on Mr.
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throughout by insisting that Jacmain's discharge was not discipli-
nary but was rather rejection during probation.
Under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, '3 a disciplinary
action (not a rejection for cause during probation) resulting in
discharge permits the grievor, after exhausting the grievance
process, to have the matter referred to adjudication, 1 4 and, indeed,
Mr. Jacmain took that course of action. At that level, the
adjudicator first made a preliminary determination' 5 that the
employer's rejection of Jacmain constituted a disciplinary discharge
and that, therefore, as adjudicator, he had jurisdiction to hear the
matter on its merits. Following such a hearing, the adjudicator held
that there had been insufficient reason for Jacmain's disciplinary
discharge and accordingly allowed his grievance and ordered
reinstatement and reimbursement for his loss of earnings. 16
Totally dissatisfied with that decision, the employer questioned
the adjudicator's jurisdiction and referred the issue to the Public
Service Staff Relations Board. The Board, however, held that the
adjudicator had not erred in law nor exceeded his jurisdiction to hear
the case, notwithstanding that Mr. Jacmain was on probation and
that he had purportedly been rejected under s.28(3) of the Public
Service Employment Act. The Board held further that the
adjudicator had not erred when he concluded that Jacmain's
dismissal was of a disciplinary nature and that Mr. Jacmain had
been discharged without sufficient reason.
The employer proceeded under s.28 of the Federal Court Act 17 to
ask the Federal Court of appeal to review and set aside the decision
of the Public Service Staff Relations Board. The decision of the
Court of Appeal was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada. In the course of that judicial process a number of important
issues became evident. Some of them are relatively specific, others
are more general and far reaching in their implications. Unfortu-
nately, as will be seen, not all questions are definitively resolved by
the Courts. Some of the issues are noted below, and, in the course
Jacmain but that this had been revoked following a different grievance
adjudication.
13. Supra, note 10. This Act hereinafter refered to as the PSSR Act, and the Public
Service Employment Act will hereinafter be referred to in the notes simply as the
PSE Act.
14. See s.91 of the PSSR Act.
15. That determination rendered August 1, 1974.
16. That decision rendered January 31, 1975.
17. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1; R.S.C. 1970, 2nd Supp., c. 10
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of the paper, where possible, an attempt will be made to summarize
the views of the Courts as they relate to them:
(1) First, is the employer's characterization of the dismissal as
either a rejection for cause or disciplinary discharge decisive in
determining whether or not, with reference to that dismissal, an
adjudicator acting under the Public Service Staff Relations Act had
jurisdiction to hear a grievance? Or is such an adjudicator entitled to
inquire into the facts of a particular case to determine whether or not
the action taken by the employer was, in fact, rejection for cause
(during the worker's probation) or a disciplinary discharge?
(2) Does protection against disciplinary discharge extend to
probationary workers or, more broadly, does rejection of a
probationary employee for cause, of itself, constitute a disciplinary
discharge?
(3) Where the adjudicator (like any other federal tribunal) is
challenged on the matter of his jurisdiction, what step or procedure
should he take?
(4) On whom does the burden of proving absence of jurisdiction
in the administrative tribunal lie? And if the tribunal's jurisdiction is
challenged on appeal or in review proceedings, does that burden
shift?
(5) Is subs. 28(1) (a) or (c) 18 of the Federal Court Act applicable
when challenging the decision of an administrative tribunal on
questions of jurisdictional fact or law?
(6) In the "review" of a tribunal's decision on questions of
jurisdiction, what is the role of the Federal Court of Appeal?
(7) Is the standard or test for the review of jurisdictional findings
of fact different from that used when reviewing findings of law
going to jurisdiction?
The unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by
18. Section 28 of the Federal Court Act reads as follows:
28.(1) Notwithstanding section 18 or the provisions of any other Act, the Court
of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application to review and set
aside a decision or order, other than a decision or order of an administrative
nature not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis, made
by or in the course of proceedings before a federal board, commission or other
tribunal, upon the ground that the board, commission or tribunal (a) failed to
observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to
exercise its jurisdiction; (b) erred in law in making its decision or order, whether
or not the error appears on the face of the record; or (c) based its decision or
order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a preverse or capricious
manner or without regard for the material before it.
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Heald J. is examined first.19 One of the first issues he considered
was the duty of an administrative tribunal faced with a challenge to
its jurisdiction. In that regard, Heald J. adopted the views of Jackett
C.J. in an appendix to the latter's decision in Cutter.20 There, the
Chief Justice wrote:
. .. speaking very generally, when such a question arises, a
Tribunal must take a position [as to its jurisdiction] even though it
cannot make a binding decision 2 ' ....
In order to reach a conclusion on such a question, it may,
depending on the circumstances, have to hear evidence with
regard thereto. If it concludes that it has no jurisdiction and
consequently refuses to proceed, a person who feels aggrieved by
that conclusion has his remedy in mandamus. If it concludes...
it has jurisdiction . . . [and proceeds], a person who feels
aggrieved by that conclusion has his remedy in prohibition2 2 or a
s.28 application 23 in respect of the Tribunal's ultimate decision
depending on the circumstances.
24
Having decided that the adjudicator hearing Jacmain's grievance
proceeded properly in making a determination as to its own
jurisdiction, Heald J. next set out to consider whether or not, on the
evidence, there was support for the adjudicator's decision that the
dismissal was disciplinary in nature. He found, however, that all
communication both to Jacmain and the Public Service Commission
was unequivocal in expressing the view that the employee was
being rejected for cause. 25 Further, the Court found that the
19. See A. G. of Canada v. P.S.S.R. Board, [1977] 1 F.C. 91
20. Cutter Laboratories International v. Anti-dumping Tribunal, [1976] 1 F.C.
446
21. In some instances a statutory right of appeal on a question of law lies to another
tribunal or, often, the regular courts. There is, of course, a right of review at
common law or, now quite frequently, under some statutory provision.
22. As was decided in Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] S.C.R.
756, a person alleging that the tribunal in question does not have jurisdiction may
bring the point before the tribunal or he may proceed directly to the court for
prohibition, especially if the matter of jurisdiction is a "short and neat question of
law" and not a question of law depending upon particular facts. In that regard see
the Bell case at 722 where Martland J. (delivering the majority judgment) refers to
Exparte Northfield (Highgate) Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 103 at 107.
23. If a party brings the issue of jurisdiction to the tribunal itself and the tribunal
decides contrary to its contention and then proceeds to decide on the merits, the
party who feels aggreived could then certainly proceed to have the decision set
aside in the Court of Appeal under s.28 of the Federal Court Act.
24. In Cutter, supra, at 453
25. Jacmain apparently made many complaints relating to the administration of the
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evidence as to cause adduced before the adjudicator, showed clearly
a classic example of behaviour which would justify rejection of an
employee during a probationary period.
26
In the course of his judgment, Heald J. noted that the Public
Service Staff Relations Board, in confirming the adjudicator's
decision, had relied on the decision in Fardella. 27 In that case, the
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development had
appointed the individual involved, on a probationary contract, as a
child care worker at La Tuque Student Residence. The Department,
however, terminated his employment when he refused to comply
with an order of the administrator directing him to bring to Sunday
service all children under his care. In Fardella, the Federal Court of
Appeal found that the adjudicator had been correct in assuming
jurisdiction as it was indeed a disciplinary discharge under s.91 of
the Public Service Staff Relations Act and not rejection of a
probationary employee under s.5 of the Indian School Residence
Administration and Child Workers Employment Regulations.
However, Mr. Justice Heald found the factual situation in
Fardella quite different from that in Jacmain. He wrote in his
judgment:
In Fardella . . . it was far from clear that the applicant was being
"rejected" rather than being discharged for disciplinary reasons.
While there was some indication originally that steps would be
taken to reject Fardella on probation, subsequent events took
place which were more consistent with a disciplinary discharge.
This is not the situation in the case at bar where the two letters of
February 25, 197428 clearly establish rejection during the
probatiqn period.
29
With respect, it is difficult to accept the view that there were
significant distinctions to be found between the circumstances of the
office. He complained constantly, loudly and bitterly. There were outbursts,
slamming of doors and continual "jeremiads".
26. Heald J. noted in Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 98 that the Adjudicator
had conceded that the conduct complained of would justify rejection of an
employee during a probationary period.
27. Fardella v. The Queen, [1974] 2 F.C. 465
28. In a letter dated February 25, 1974, the commissioner of Official Languages
notified Jacmain that he was to be rejected during his probationary period. On the
same date and to comply with the provisions of s.28(4) of the Public Service
Employment Act, the Commissioner wrote to the Public Service Commission
notifying it of his intention to reject Jacmain because he was unable to fulfil his
designated function.
29. Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 98.
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two cases. In both, the employee was appointed to his respective
position subject to a probation period. 30 In both cases, before the
end of that period, 3 ' a superior made it clear in oral conversation
with the worker involved 32 that steps would be taken to reject him
during probation. In each case the worker received a letter
indicating that employment would be terminated before the end of
the trial period. 33 And in both cases, the employer attempted to
impose a suspension before the official notification of termination
of employment. 34
In any event, having found the termination of employment in
Jacmain to be one of rejection for cause (during probation), Heald
J. then wondered whether or not an adjudicator acting under s.91 of
the Public Service Staff Relations Act might still be said to have
jurisdiction in such a matter. 35 To assist him in the query, His
Lordship turned again to Fardella and also the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Bell Canada v. Office and
30. Fardella's probationary period was to be one year long. Jacmain, too, was
appointed to the Complaints Branch of the Commission of Official Languages
subject to a probation period.
31. InJacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 94, Heald J. makes it clear that the notice
of rejection of February 25, 1974 was within Jacmain's probationary period. In
Fardella, supra, the applicant was appointed on October 18, 1972 subject to a one
year probation and given written notice November 10, 1972 that his position would
terminate December 11, 1972.
32. In Fardella, supra, note 27, Fr. Bonnard, the employee's superior, told the
grievor on Oct. 23, 1972 that he had little choice but to recommend termination of
the worker's employment in light of the worker's attitude. On October 25 of the
same year, Fr. Bonnard advised the worker orally that steps would be taken to
reject him on probation. In Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 the Commissioner of
Official Languages informed the worker orally on October 23, 1973 of the
employer's intention to reject during probation.
33. The letter sent from the employer to Jacmain was dated February 25, 1974. In
Fardella, supra, note 27, in a letter written November 10, 1972, the Department of
Indian and Northern Development said: ". . . your appointment was subject to a
probation period ... [As] ... you have failed at many occasions to carry out
duties, which were part of your job, we advise you that your appointment ... will
terminate on December 1I, 1972."
34. In Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19, the Commissioner of Official Languages,
prior to giving notice of termination of employment, had imposed a five day
suspension. In Fardella, supra, note 27, we find that a suspension had been given
the worker prior to his notification of termination of employment.
35. Section 91(1) says, in part:
Where an employee has presented a grievance up to and including the final level
in the grievance process with respect to . . . disciplinary action resulting in
discharge, suspension or a financial penalty, and his grievance has not been
dealt with to his satisfaction, he may refer the grievance to adjudication.
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Professional Employee's International Union. 3 6 He first considered
the following passage of Chief Justice Jackett in the first mentioned
case:
I do not wish to be taken as expressing an opinion that,
where there has been, in fact, a rejection under section 5 [of the
Indian School Residence Administrators and Child Care Workers
Employment Regulations] or under s.28 of the Public Service
Employment Act, it can be classified as a dismissal in order to
create jurisdiction under s.91 of the . . . [Public Service Staff
Relations Act]. Insubordination during a probationary period
might well be "cause" for rejection, either of itself or taken with
other matters, just as it might be ground for disciplinary action
even during a probationary period. There should, however, be no
room for doubt, if the matter is handled as it should be handled,
as to which action has been taken [emphasis added]. 
7
At best, that comment raises more questions than it answers, and,
perhaps, should never have been employed as a guiding instrument.
Further, it appears to mesh together a number of important issues
which must surely be considered separately. For instance, assuming
that classification of the dismissal as a disciplinary discharge is
crucial for the purpose of giving the adjudicator jurisdiction, it is
only then that it becomes absolutely necessary to establish criteria to
differentiate between the two types of dismissal. It might be that
form, and form alone, would emerge as the discriminating factor.
And it would also be vital to determine which "body", in the first
instance, was authorized to make a judgment as to the type of
dismissal involved. On the other hand, the nature or type of
dismissal might be inconsequential. For example, if the adjudicator
were empowered to consider both matters of rejection and
discharge, or if rejection, in most cases at least, were to be seen as
part of the larger category called "disciplinary discharge", then
certainly the dichotomy and the criteria necessary to make the
distinction would both be virtually unnecessary. And it would no
longer be vital to designate a particular body or person as the one
responsible for determining whether the dismissal was of one kind
or another. In short, therefore, contrary to what is suggested by the
quotation, if rejection can be classified as a dismissal so that an
adjudicator under the Public Service Staff Relations Act has
jurisdiction, then it is academic, at best, to be concerned with
whether or not a certain type of conduct establishes one form of
36. [1974] S.C.R. 335
37. In Fardella, supra, note 27 at 480
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dismissal or another, or whether the dismissal was indeed rejection
or discharge.
In any event, from what the Chief Justice said in Fardella it
appears that he would place considerable weight, if not total
reliance, on the "way" in which the employer handled the matter.
In other words, if the matter were handled by the employer from the
start and consistently thereafter as either rejection for cause or
disciplinary discharge there should be no subsequent question or
issue to be resolved concerning it. It is perhaps because of such
reasoning that Heald J. stressed in Jacmain that, unlike the matter in
Fardella, the facts before him were "clear and unequivocal" 38 and
that the letters of February 25, 1974 from the employer both to
Jacmain and the Public Service Commission were absolutely clear
and definitive in expressing the view that the employee was being
rejected for cause within the meaning of the Public Service
Employment Act. 39
In Jacmain, Heald J. also concurred with what he believed to be
the view of Chief Justice Jackett4° where there was in fact a
rejection under s.28 of the Public Service Employment Act, it could
not be classified as a discharge in order to create jurisdiction under
s.91 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. But in finding the
Jacmain matter to be truly a rejection for cause, Heald J. looked
beyond the mere intention and conduct of the employer. He fully
examined all the evidence 41 adduced before the adjudicator -
including, but not restricted to, the evidence relating to the
employer's letters - and then and only then concluded that
. . . the conduct complained of in this case is a classic example of
behaviour which would justify rejection of an employee during a
probation period (and this was conceded by the adjudicator)
42
38. In Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 14 at 98
39. Id. at 96-7
40. Jackett C.J. may have expressed that view in Fardella, supra, note 27 at 480.
Heald J. found such holding to exist in the quote noted in the text, supra, The
reader, like this writer, may find the interpretation given that passage by Heald J.
extremely difficult to accept. (See p. 98 in Jacmain (C.A.).)
41. At one point in Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 97 Heald J. wrote: "The
evidence as to the cause adduced before the adjudicator was, inter alia, to the effect
that Jacmain made many complaints relating to the administration of the office, that
he complained constantly . . . bitterly, that it was Mr. Jacmain's attitude, as
displayed in tactlessness and impoliteness . . . that gave his employer cause for
complaint."
42. In Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 98.
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Mr. Justice Heald also wondered what the result might be if the
employer were less than honest as to his reasons for terminating
employment. Reiterating that the employer in Jacmain had ample
cause for rejection, he assumed that
There could only be disciplinary action camouflaged as rejection
in a case where no valid or bona fide grounds existed for
rejection. 4A (Italics added.)
In such cases, it would appear that Heald J. would be prepared,
despite the employer's consistency and persistence, to support a
finding of disciplinary discharge during probation. One wonders,
however, whether there exists any conduct which might be said to
support a disciplinary discharge, but which, at the same time, could
not be seen as supporting rejection for cause. 44 If that were the case,
it would be impossible to dismiss a probationary worker on
disciplinary grounds, and such worker would never receive the
benefits of the adjudicative process upon termination of his
employment.
Having concluded definitively, however, that the factual situation
in Jacmain gave the employer ample cause for rejection, Heald J.
then considered whether "action taken to separate an employee
from his employment that is, in form, 45 under one authority [might]
43. Id. at 99.
44. As noted by de Grandpr6 J. in Jacmain supra, note 1 (S.C.C):
The employer's right to reject an employee during the probation period is very
broad. To use the words of s.28 of the Public Service Employment Act. . . it is
sufficient that there be a cause, a reason. Counsel for the appellant forthrightly
acknowledged at the hearing that at first glance the legislative provision would
appear to allow the employer to advance almost any reason, and that his
decision could not be disputed unless his conduct were tainted with bad faith.
Also, in his judgment de Grandpr6 cited and seemed to approve of the following
from Re United Electrical Workers & Square D.Co., Ltd., (1956) 6 Lab. Arb. Cas.
289 at 292:
An employee .. .on probation ... is undergoing a period of testing. The
standards set by the company are not necessarily confined to standards relating
to quality and quantity of production, they may embrace consideration of the
employer's character . . . and general suitability for retention . . . .Although
• ..any employee . . . can be discharged for cause .... the employment of a
probationer may be terminated if, in the judgment of the company prior to
completion of the probation period, the probationer has failed to meet the
standards set by the [employer] and is considered to be not satisfied.
45. Having considered the evidence as to cause which was before the adjudicator
and having considered also other aspects of the factual situation in Jacmain and
having then concluded that the dismissal was in fact rejection for cause, it seems
strange that Heald J. would again return to the use of the word "form" at this point
in his judgment.
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be treated as having been taken under another". 46 And after
reviewing the Bell Canada4 7 decision, he concluded:
For the adjudicator to have jurisdiction under section 91(1) (b) [of
the Public Service Staff Relations Act] on the facts of this case, it
would be necessary for that section to have included in it, the
words: "a rejection for cause during the probationary period" or
words of like intent. Without words of that nature, the
adjudicator is without jurisdiction. 4 8 (Italics added)
Displeased with the ultimate decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal, Jacmain proceeded to the Supreme Court of Canada. But
there, too, he was to be disappointed. The nine man Bench split five
to four in favour of the employer and rendered three substantially
different sets of reasons.
Speaking for himself, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ., Mr.
Justice de Grandpr6 found the crux of the matter to be this: 49
. ..does rejection of an employee on probation because his
superior is not satisfied with him constitute a disciplinary action
which is therefore subject to adjudication?
If that were indeed the starting point of the inquiry, then it seems to
assume that there is no question as to whether or not the decision
was truly a rejection for cause or a disciplinary discharge. It starts
from the premise that there was a rejection for cause and queries
whether such rejection is also an adjudicatable disciplinary matter.
In other words, the inquiry becomes essentially one of determining
whether rejection of a probationary employee is also, for the
purposes of s.91 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, a
disciplinary action. Whether or not Mr. Justice de Grandpr6
intended to make that the crucial issue is unclear. 50 In fact, the issue
46. In Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 99.
47. Supra.
48. In Jacmain (C.A.), supra, note 19 at 99-100.
49. In the Court of Appeal, Heald J. suggests in Jacmain (C.A.) supra note 19 at
98 that the conduct complained of in this case, besides justifying rejection of an
employee during probation, "might also be ground for disciplinary action during a
probationary period." Compare, however, comments of Heald J. at 100 in his
judgment where he wrote: "To hold that a probationary employee acquires vested
rights to adjudication during his period of probation is to completely ignore the
plain meaning of the words used in s.28 of the Public Service Employment Act and
s.91 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act." In the Supreme Court of Canada,
de Grandpr6 J. quotes from the parts of the judgment in the Court of Appeal and
concurs with the views expressed by the lower Court. (Supra, note 1.)
50. That this was not an error in phrasing seems evident from another statement of
de Grandpr6 J. He wrote: "The employer ... [submitted] through counsel that
rejection during a probationary period ... does not constitute discharge."
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is never fully considered and is never answered in his judgment.
Instead, the major part of his inquiry5 ' seems to focus on the
fundamental question as to whether the employer's action was truly
rejection for cause or a disciplinary discharge.
52
Early in the judgment, de Grandpr6 J. examined the
Adjudicator's analysis of the facts and the latter's finding that
• . . the behaviour of the grievor towards his colleagues, his
superiors and some of his subordinates was somewhat irascible,
reflecting his own personality.
Then, without much further explanation, His Lordship made it clear
that he fully accepted the Adjudicator's finding of fact and
questioned only his conclusion of law. At this point in the
judgment, there appears to be a digression. Mr. Justice de Grandpr6
notes that where there is contradictory evidence on the facts relating
to a question of jurisdiction, appeal tribunals 53 are not bound by the
limits of s.28(l) (c) of the Federal Court Act. 54 In other words,
where the issue is jurisdictional, the Court may set aside the
impugned decision without finding it preverse or capricious.
55
Having made those observations, de Grandpr6 J. then turned to
consider the views of Heald J. in the Court below and interpreted his
decision in this way:5sa
51. In the last few pages of his judgment de Grandpr6 J. considered the appellant's
claim that the Court of Appeal erred by examining the matter in light of the English
version of the adjudicator's decision when the decision was delivered in French. It
is only in the judgment of de Grandpr6 J. that this issue is considered. He found no
substantial difference between the two versions and underlined the fact that his own
opinion was based purely and simply on the adjudicator's finding of fact.
52. Like the other members of the Court de Grandpr6 J. accepted the view that the
jurisdiction of the Adjudicator was dependent on the matter involving "disciplinary
action resulting in discharge, suspension or a financial penalty" under the terms of
s.91(1) (b) of the PSSR Act. At one point Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 wrote: "In the
context of the case at bar, the adjudicator has jurisdiction only if the matter
involved is disciplinary ....
53. It appears that de Grandpr6 J. is here referring only to the Court of Appeal in
the exercise of its original review powers under s.28 of the Federal Court Act.
54. Supra, note 18.
55. According to Dickson J. in Jacmain (and this point is discussed later in the
paper) s.28(1) (c) of the Federal Court Act concerns questions of fact within
jurisdiction. de Grandpr6 J. suggests that review under that subsection is relatively
restricted, whereas review under, say, s. 28(1) (a) (concerning jurisdictional
matters) is not so limited. Section 28 is set out in note 18, supra.
55a. Elsewhere de Grandpr6 J. wrote:
The case at bar is not a case of disciplinary action. The employee's poor
conduct, irascible attitude and unsatisfactory adjustment to his surroundings
were valid reasons for his superior's unwillingness to give him a permanent
position in his Service.
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The Court of Appeal held, when the case came before it, that the
adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to weigh the cause of
rejection once it was established that this cause was not frivolous
and that the rejection was not based on anything but good faith
... . (Italics mine.)
Where the Adjudicator erred, according to Mr. Justice de Grandpr6,
was in weighing the evidence before him to determine whether there
was sufficient cause for rejection when, under the terms of s.28 of
the Public Service Employment Act, it is sufficient that there be a
cause, a reason.5 6 Implicitly, then, de Grandpr6 J. accepted the
Adjudicator's authority to inquire into whether the grievor's
dismissal was disciplinary in nature or whether it was truly rejection
for cause. But since there were "bona fide grounds for rejection",
to use a phrase of Heald J., it was not open to the Adjudicator to
consider, as he did, whether there were sufficient reasons.
In a concurring judgment, Pigeon J. seems to have used a similar
approach and arrived at the same result. He found one of the "true
questions" in the case to be this:
Was the Adjudicator entitled to review the sufficiency of the
cause of rejection in order to decide whether it was in fact a
disciplinary dismissal? (Italics added)
In answering that question, His Lordship may be said to have
proceeded in this way:
(1) An employer cannot deprive an employee of the benefit of the
grievance procedure by labelling a disciplinary discharge a
rejection.
(2) Where a probationary employee is purportedly rejected by the
deputy head under s.28 of the Public Service Employment Act, "an
adjudicator has jurisdiction to inquire whether what is in form a
rejection is in substance a disciplinary dismissal."
(3) In determining whether or not he has jurisdiction, the
Adjudicator is not permitted to
(a) review the deputy head's decision as to the suitability of the
employee or
(b) determine whether a rejection was adequately motivated or
(c) decide whether or not there was sufficient cause to justify the
rejection.
56. At one point before the Supreme Court of Canada, Jacmain's counsel
conceded that the statutory provisions would seem to allow the employer to dismiss
a probationary for almost any reason. Refer again to note 44, supra.
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However, given the restrictions set out in number three (above),
it is difficult to see how the Adjudicator might carry out his role as
set out in number two. In other words, one would have thought that
an Adjudicator would almost of necessity be required to inquire
both into the motivation of the employer and into the sufficiency of
reason or cause to determine "whether what is in form a rejection is
in substance a disciplinary dismissal". But that proposition would
apparently involve, among other things, placing on the word
"form" 5 7 a meaning the Justice did not intend.
Thus, under the approach suggested by the majority (i.e., the
judgments of de Grandpr6 and Pigeon JJ.), it appears that any bona
fide ground, which in conjunction with other grounds would be
sufficient to support rejection but which of itself does not, is
nonetheless sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator
under s.91 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. And since, as
indicated, it is difficult to conceive of any ground which would
support or help support disciplinary discharge58 but not rejection, it
is also difficult to conceive of any situation where an Adjudicator
might have jurisdiction with respect to any probationary worker,
59
unless, of course, as de Grandpr6 J. and others suggested, rejection
of a probationary employee, of itself, constitutes a disciplinary
action. But no member of the Supreme Court seems to have
57. Elsewhere in his judgment, Pigeon J. gave some indication of what he would
not be prepared to accept in this regard. He wrote: "At the hearing, counsel for the
Attorney-General properly conceded that the right of a probationary employee to
launch a grievance against a disciplinary decision could not be ousted by making
such dismissal in the form of a rejection under s.28 of the Public Service
Employment Act".
At another place he wrote: "... I cannot agree that an employer can deprive an
employee of the benefit of the grievance procedure by labelling a disciplinary
discharge a rejection ....- (Italics added.)
58. In his judgment de Grandpr6 J. recognized that the remarks quoted from Re
United Electrical Workers, supra, note 44, were made in a case involving
discharge in the private sector. He could see no basis, however, for saying that in
this area there was a distinction between the private and public sectors. He added:
"In the public sector, as in the private sector, the employee who wants to improve
his lot must still, I hope, take certain risks."
59. Dickson J. in his judgment wrote:
The issue which this appeal brings squarely to the fore is whether the protection
against disciplinary discharge [i.e., the right to have the matter proceed to
adjudication] extends to probationary employees.
Prima facie they are protected. Yet, if . . . rejection for cause in effect
subsumes disciplinary discharge, then every case of rejection for cause and the
protection proves to be illusory.
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seriously considered that possibility.
There is one other matter raised in the judgment of Pigeon J.
which should be mentioned here. Having reached a conclusion as to
the Adjudicator's function and jurisdiction, His Lordship then
turned to speculation and considered a "secondary" issue, one
which, in light of his first determination, no longer required a
definitive answer. He wrote:
I doubt that if I held the Adjudicator could review the sufficiency
of the cause of rejection, I would hold the Federal Court of
Appeal entitled to revise his decision. It is true that it is a finding
on which his jurisdiction depends, however it was noted in Segal
v. The City of Montreal (1931, S.C.R. 460 at p. 473) that where
the jurisdiction depends on contested facts, a superior court will
hesitate before reversing the inferior court's finding of fact, and
will only do so on "extremely strong" grounds. (Italics added.)
Dickson J., speaking for himself, the Chief Justice and Spence J.,
in dissent, would, it appears, tend to agree with that last
proposition. However, his approach on other issues and his
perception of what the Adjudicator is to consider are so
fundamentally at variance that they must be fully set out here.
In the course of his reasons, Dickson J. considered the judgment
of the Federal Court of Appeal in the instant case (approved, it will
be recalled, in part at least, by de Grandpr6 J.). According to Mr.
Justice Dickson, Heald J. proceeded on this basis:
(1) Jacmain's attitude with respect to his superiors, his colleagues
and his work was wrong.
(2) That would justify rejection for cause.
(3) There could only be discharge for disciplinary reasons where
there was no valid cause for rejection.
(4) Therefore, the termination of employment was a rejection for
cause, and the adjudicator was without jurisdiction.
With reference to that reasoning, Dickson J. commented:
[It] . . . contains fundamental fallacies. First, it approaches the
matter from the wrong end. Two questions must be distinguished:
(i) was the termination of employment disciplinary discharge, or
rejection for cause? [That is a jurisdictional question.] (ii) was
termination [for either reason] justified? 59a [That question goes to
the merits.]
Mdr. Justice Heald answered the second question [namely, that
59a. It would seem, however, that once the Adjudicator decided that the matter
were truly rejection for cause, he would not have jurisdiction to proceed to consider
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there was justification for rejection] and used . . . [that] answer
to resolve the first question. The proper approach is to answer the
first question and then, depending upon the answer, to proceed to
the second question.
And to also distinguish his own approach from that of Pigeon J.,
Mr. Justice Dickson added:
• . . it does not inexorably follow that, simply because there
lurked in the background some cause which might justify
rejection, the termination must, of necessity, be rejection and not
disciplinary discharge.
Before outlining the steps in the reasoning of Dickson J. based on
the premises just noted, it is best to pause here to consider what both
he and, to a certain extent, de Grandpr6 J. noted about the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal.
It will be recalled that Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 in his judgment
sought to point out the fundamental difference between paragraphs
(a) and (c) of section 28(1) of the Federal Court Act. 60 He
concluded that where the question was jurisdictional, the Court of
Appeal was permitted to set aside the decision of an administrative
tribunal without finding it preverse or capricious. The point made
by Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 seems to be dealt with more fully in the
judgment of Dickson J. and the latter's preliminary observations
may, perhaps, be best set out in this fashion:
(1) If a question is a jurisdictional question of either fact or law,
then s.28(1) (a) of the Federal Court Act is the applicable provision.
(2) If the matter is a question of law within jurisdiction, then
s.28(l) (b) is the applicable provision.
(3) And if the question is one of fact withing jurisdiction, then
s.28(l) (c) applies.
There are at least two other significant comments of Mr. Justice
Dickson in this area which should be noted.
First:
Section 28(1) (c) is an addition to the common law and concerns
non-jurisdictional questions of fact. (Italics added.)
Also:
... the Courts . . . should exercise restraint in declaring a
tribunal to be without jurisdiction when it has reached its decision
the merits of the case and decide whether the rejection were justified. Dickson J.
does not expressly consider that issue.
60. Refer again to note 18, supra.
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honestly and fairly and with due regard 6 ' to the material before it.
The Court should allow some latitude in its surveillance of
jurisdictional findings. It should ask whether there is substantial
evidence6 2 for decisions of fact and rational basis for decisions of
law, or mixed decisions of fact and law. The error must be
manifest. 63 The role of the Court is one of review, not trial de
novo. (Italics added.)
Concerning the last passage quoted, it will be recalled that Pigeon
J. (Beetz J. concurring), seems to have expressed a similar view;
that is, with reference to judicial supervision of a tribunal's findings
of fact. But where the judgments of Dickson and Pigeon JJ. are
fundamentally at variance is with reference to the function or scope
of authority, in a broad sense, of the Adjudicator in determining
whether there has been rejection for cause or disciplinary discharge.
Pigeon J. would curtail the Adjudicator's role to that of discerning
whether or not there might be said to be "some ground for
rejection" while Mr. Justice Dickson would not so restrict him.
And the fundamental difference between Dickson and de Grandpri
JJ. appears to be that the former would restrict a review court in
overturning an Adjudicator's decisions on jurisdictional questions,
whereas the latter does not appear to concur in the view that
questions of fact determined by inferior tribunals should be
interferred with only in exceptional circumstances.
6 4
61. InIn re North Coast Air Service Ltd., [1972] F.C. 390 (C.A.) Walsh J. at 420
found that no positive evidence had been placed before the Court which indicated
that
"due consideration" had not been given the appellant's submission. In the
North Coast case it was contended that the manner in which the appellant's
commercial services licence had been amended by the Air Transport Committee
"amounted to a decision founded on an erroneous finding made without regard
to the material before the Commission". (Compare that wording with s.28(1)
(c) of the Federal Court Act.)
It is interesting to find the use of the word "due" in the Supreme Court of
Canada with reference to what an administrative tribunal must be seen to do when
deciding jurisdictional questions of fact.
62. Presumably, a review court would intervene only where it found no evidence
to support the inferior courts determination on a question of jurisdictional fact or
where there was only some evidence to support the tribunal's finding.
63. Under s.28(1) (b) of the Federal Court Act, errors of law no longer have to
appear on the face of the record. Accordingly, if the no-evidence rule is an error of
law as found in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Hernandez [ 19731 F.C. 1206 (see
esp. 1208), then such lack of evidence need not appear patent. It seems, however,
that jurisdictional errors of fact must be "manifest".
64. This last assertion concerning the position of de Grandpr6 J. is strongly
dependent on what one finds the Court of Appeal to have decided at first instance in
that regard and whether or not such views are reflected in three paragraphs of the
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Let us now set out Mr. Justice Dickson's position more fully:
(1) Rejection for cause 65 and disciplinary discharge are separate
and distinct concepts.
66
(2) The dividing line between the two may be blurred, but it is a
line which the adjudicator must draw and the matter is not
concluded by the employer characterizing the severance as rejection
for cause.
(3) Accordingly, an adjudicator is entitled to hear evidence and
inquire into the facts of a particular case to determine whether the
action taken by the employer is, in fact, a rejection for cause or a
disciplinary discharge.
(4) Substance and not form governs. The form of the notice
cannot deprive an adjudicator of jurisdiction if on all the facts, the
action taken by the employer is truly disciplinary in nature.
(5) In the instant case, the Adjudicator heard the evidence and
found that no reason had been given by the employer either orally or
in writing for the worker's dismissal and that the only cause for such
dismissal that could be adduced from all the evidence was a prior
attempt to discipline the employee with a five day suspension - a
suspension which was revoked following a different grievance
adjudication.67
(6) Insofar as the Adjudicator had to choose between conflicting
pieces of data, the question was one of jurisdictional fact; as it
required a decision as to whether or not either of the two relevant
judgment of Heald J. quoted and concurred in by de Grandpr6 J. in his own
judgment.
But there is also subsidiary support for the contention that de Grandpr6 J. would
permit review of a tribunal's findings on questions of jurisdiction on the basis of a
trial de novo. At another place in his judgment he wrote: ". . . where there is
contradictory evidence on the facts relating to a question of jurisdiction, appeal
tribunals are not bound by the limits imposed by s.28(l) (c) [of the Federal Court
Act]. They may set aside the decision without finding it perverse or capricious".
Upon examining the context of those remarks one might well assume that the
"appeal tribunals" referred to is, in fact, the Federal Court of Appeal exercising its
original supervisory power under s.28 of the Federal Court Act.
65. "Rejection for cause", Dickson J. wrote, "will be for reasons otherwise than
disciplinary."
66. In arriving at that conclusion Dickson J. implicitly found that protection
against disciplinary discharge extended to probationary employees and that it could
not be assumed that rejection for cause subsumed disciplinary discharge.
67. In October of 1973 Jacmain was suspended for five days - a disciplinary
action. That action led to a grievance adjudication in which the adjudicator ordered
on March 27, 1974 (File 166-2-1002) that the suspension be revoked and that all
references to that suspension in official records be expunged. The adjudicator
noted, however, that the employee's conduct had been reprehensible.
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statutes 68 covered the data chosen, it was a question of law. 69
(7) As the issue here was neither a question of fact or law within
jurisdiction, the review Court - namely, the Federal Court of
Appeal - was not inhibited by either s.28(l) (b) or (c) of the
Federal Court Act.
(8) The crucial issue, therefore, was simply whether or not the
Adjudicator's decision fell within tolerable parameters.
(9) In considering a jurisdictional question under its supervisory
powers, the role of the Court of Appeal is one of review and not trial
de novo. Accordingly, the correctness of every detail upon which
the jurisdiction of a tribunal depends cannot be subjected to re-trial
in the Court of Appeal (under s.28 of the Federal Court Act) and its
opinion substituted for that of the tribunal. 70 The Court must allow
some latitude in its surveillance of jurisdictional findings. And so,
by attempting to examine in "every detail" the "factual issues"
upon which the Adjudicator's jurisdiction depended, the Court of
Appeal erred.
(10) On the jurisdictional question of fact, there was substantial
evidence to uphold the decision that what occured was a discharge
for disciplinary reasons. Accordingly, the Adjudicator did have
jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the case and consider
whether there was sufficient reason for the discharge on disciplinary
grounds. And on the jurisdictional question of law, there was a
rational basis for the Adjudicator's decision concerning the scope
of the two Acts - the Public Service Employment Act and the Public
Service Staff Relations Act.
The ultimate result achieved by Mr. Justice Dickson may seem to
provide both for the aggrieved and the observer a greater level of
satisfaction and seems to be more in symmetry with our general
notions of justice. It seems to properly balance the interests of the
employer and employee and to offer proper restraints for judicial
intervention without at the same time giving unrestrained rein to the
administrative process. But there are difficulties.
68. That is the Public Service Employment Act, and the Public Service Staff
Relations Act.
69. The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the distinction between jurisdictional
questions of law and fact in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Internat. Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425. For earlier cases in the area
see Toronto Newspaper Guild and Globe Printing Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18 and
Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 497. See also Galloway
Lumber Co. Ltd. [1965] S.C.R. 222
70. That sentence is almost a verbatim reproduction of the words used by Dickson
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For example, in assessing the Adjudicator's determination on the
jurisdictional question of fact, Mr. Justice Dickson noted that there
was substantial evidence upon which the Adjudicator might rely to
uphold his decision that a disciplinary discharge was involved. His
Lordship felt, therefore, that the Adjudicator could next proceed to
consider whether, on the merits, there was sufficient reason for
discharge on disciplinary grounds. Some doubt arises, however, as
to whether or not the Adjudicator proceeded exactly in that way. As
analyzed and set out in the judgment of de Grandpr6 J. 71 and that
also of Pigeon J. 72, the Adjudicator first set his mind to weighing
the evidence before him for the purpose of determining whether or
not there was sufficient cause for rejection. Having found the
grounds insufficient, he concluded that a disciplinary discharge was
in fact involved. Assuming the Adjudicator proceeded in that
fashion, without in any way attempting to disparage either him or
71. As alluded to earlier, there is some difficulty in understanding the judgments
and decisions in this case because of the imprecision with which certain words are
used. Often the words "dismissal", "severance", "discharge", "rejection" or
"termination" are used in a general sense; sometimes, however, the word
"discharge" is used to refer to "disciplinary discharge" and the word "rejection"
is used to mean "rejection for cause". In their judgments, neither de Grandpr6 or
Pigeon JJ. appears to reserve the use of the word "discharge" for reference to
disciplinary discharge.
de Grandpr6 J. sets out the adjudicator's analysis of the facts and his conclusion
in this way: (a) The adjudicator considered the evidence and concluded that the
grievor's behaviour was somewhat irascible. (b) The adjudicator weighed those
facts and reasoned that there was not sufficient reason to justify dismissal of the
probationer. (c) The adjudicator then concluded that the grievor was not rejected
for cause and that he had been discharged on disciplinary grounds without
sufficient reason.
72. The following series of assertions from the judgment of Pigeon J. clearly
indicate that as he viewed the tribunal's "procedure", the adjudicator first
determined that there was not a sufficient basis to found rejection for cause and
used that determination to decide it was in fact a disciplinary discharge: (1) "The
Adjudicator being of the opinion that the facts proved did not constitute sufficient
reason for the discharge [of the probationer] held it to be disciplinary .... - (2)
"In my view . . . [one of the] true questions in this case [is] this: 1. Was the
Adjudicator entitled to review the sufficiency of the cause of rejection in order to
decide whether it was in fact a disciplinary dismissal." (3) "In the present case, the
Adjudicator found that there were grounds for deciding that the employee was
unsuitable. However, differing in that respect from the deputy head's judgment, he
was of the opinion that these grounds as established before him, was not sufficient
to justify rejection. In my view this is what he was not authorized to do because he
only had jurisdiction to review a disciplinary dismissal not a rejection. "(4) ". . . I
cannot agree that an adjudicator may proceed to revise a rejection on the basis that
if he does not consider it adequately motivated, it must be found a disciplinary
discharge."
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the method used, it does appear to be a backward method of
proceeding. It will be recalled that the Adjudicator under the Public
Service Staff Relations Act is authorized to consider disciplinary
discharges not matters of rejection for cause. Under the approach
apparently taken by the Adjudicator, the impression is certainly left
that at the outset, he dealt with or attempted to decide a matter
outside his jurisdiction. Of course, in his defence, it might be
argued that his initial steps were but part of a more comprehensive
preliminary inquiry into his jurisdiction. But whether or not Mr.
Justice Dickson would in other circumstances approve of such an
approach is, at best, a moot point.
73
Moving on to another aspect of the case, it does not appear to be
particularly evident that the Adjudicator himself perceived (or there
was in fact) "substantial evidence" upon which to make a finding
that the matter was disciplinary in nature. As noted by a unanimous
Court of Appeal, the Adjudicator conceded that the conduct
complained of in this case was a classic example of behaviour which
would justify rejection of an employee during probation. 74 In the
Supreme Court, de Grandpr6 and three other members of the Bench
concurred with the Court of Appeal on that point. And in the
judgment of Dickson J. there is a lengthy passage from the
Adjudicator's decision indicating the latter's acceptance of the view
that "it was Mr. Jacmain's attitude . . . that gave his employer
cause for complaint". And elsewhere, the Adjudicator wrote:
I agree that it is important for the employer to assess the attitude
of an employee during his probation period. 75 (Italics added)
73. It will be noted that in his judgment Dickson J. insists that a review court
should not interfere with the findings of an Adjudicator on questions of fact if there
is substantial evidence for the decision. Presumably then, an Adjudicator, not to be
overturned on decisions of fact, must be of the opinion that there was substantial
evidence on which to base his decision.
It might be as well that determinations of an Adjudicator on questions of fact
would not be interferred with by a review court if the latter found substantial
evidence to support the Adjudicator's decision even though the Adjudicator
himself, on consideration of the evidence, was not of the opinion that substantial
evidence existed.
But if one presumes that on the evidence the Adjudicator must be of the view that
substantial evidence existed to support his determination, then the Adjudicator's
perception of the evidence at the time of the determination becomes significant for
the purpose of determining the role of the review court.
74. The Court referred to the "Appeal Case" at pp. 70 and 73.
The Court of Appeal added, parenthetically it seems: [Jacmain's conduct]
... might also be ground for disciplinary action .... " (Italics added.)
75. The Adjudicator's later conclusion that there was "no evidence relating to the
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Finally, there is the decision of the Public Service Staff Relations
Board noting that the Adjudicator fully reviewed the evidence
relating to the grievor's "attitude" and that he fully acknowledged
that Mr. Jacmain had not fully adjusted to the practices and
atmosphere of the office and to the requirements of his superior.
Assuming that the grounds for dismissal are ultimately grouped
under one head (rejection) or another (discharge),7" then it seems
that every time there is a ground capable of supporting rejection it
becomes more difficult to make a finding that there existed
substantial evidence to support a disciplinary discharge. But even if
we doubt that reasoning and the approach it supports, and accept,
instead, the view that the Adjudicator, in this case, did perceive
substantial evidence to support a disciplinary discharge, might it not
be argued from what he said that he also perceived substantial
evidence to support rejection for cause. And if that was the case,
should the position and function of the Court still remain that of
review?
attitude of Mr. Jacmain" seems strange in light of the Adjudicator's total
acceptance of the Deputy Commissioner's testimony which dealt with, among
other things, Mr. Jacmain's tactlessness and impoliteness, in outbursts and the like.
All that appears in the decision of the Adjudicator dated January 31, 1975 and
partly reproduced in the judgment of Dickson J.
Although one cannot be sure, it may be that the principal witness - a Mr.
Jean-Marie Morin, Deputy Commissioner - did not explicitly state in his
testimony before the Adjudicator that it was Mr. Jacmain's attitude which
precipitated the employer's action to dismiss the probationer. Mr. Morin, however,
did testify (and his testimony was fully accepted by the Adjudicator) as to what
specific things Mr. Jacmain did and gave details of the worker's constant
complaining.
And as noted by the Federal Court of Appeal, the Adjudicator ultimately
summarized matters as follows: "All things considered, it was Mr. Jacmain's
attitude as displayed in tactlessness and impoliteness ... and in continual
"Jeremiads" that gave the employer cause for complaint."
Further, in the same decision dated January 31, 1975, the Adjudicator writes on
the matter of attitude: ". . . I conclude that the behaviour of the grievor towards his
colleagues, his superiors and some of his subordinates was somewhat irascible
.... He did not fully adjust to the . . .atmosphere of the office ...."
Adding to what may be confusing about the decision of the Adjudicator is the
following comment he made: "Although this issue tends to raise questions which
are more of a disciplinary nature, I do recognize that the employer, even in the
public service, has the right to reject an employee who cannot adjust to the
everyday routine of his job."
76. There is at least some support for that view in the judgment of Dickson J. See
note 65, supra.
In his judgment Dickson J. wrote:
... if the correctness of every detail upon which the jurisdiction of the tribunal
depends is to be subject to re-trial in the Courts and the opinion of a judge
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This line of inquiry raises an even more fundamental question not
considered in the judgment of Mr. Justice Dickson and that is
whether or not the perception of the Adjudicator as to the existence
of substantial evidence to support his finding is to be considered
particularly crucial or whether a review court may, in spite of its
limited powers in such matters, uphold a tribunal's findings as to the
type of dismissal involved provided it, the court, and not necessarily
the Adjudicator, finds substantial evidence to support the tribunal's
determination. In other words, while in the opinion of the
Adjudicator there may only be some evidence to support his
classification of the dismissal, a review court will not substitute its
opinion for that of the tribunal as to the nature of the dismissal
provided that the court finds, in its view, substantial evidence to
support the Adjudicator's determination on point. If that were the
case, then, with reference to jurisdictional questions, the court
would seem to be involved in something which might be
appropriately termed a "semi-trial de novo".
Indeed, let us consider more broadly the general principle that in
supervising the function of an administrative tribunal, the courts are
to exercise only a review power and not intervene if there is
"substantial evidence 77 to support decisions of fact and a rationale
basis for decisions of law". Obviously, in the opinion78 of Dickson
J. there was substantial evidence to support the Adjudicator's
finding of fact. In arriving at that conclusion, he reviewed and cited
a number of passages from both the written decision of the
Adjudicator and the Public Service Staff Relations Board to which
the matter had been referred. In proceeding in that manner His
Lordship appears to be demonstrating how a review court should
proceed. But the interesting question is this: By what "process"
does a review court determine whether or not there is in fact
substituted for that of the tribunal, then the special experience and knowledge of
the members of such a tribunal and the advantage they have of hearing and
seeing the witnesses may be lost.
77. S.A. de Smith in Judicial Control of Administrative Action at 119-20 has
noted:
"The adoption of a general rule in English administrative law empowering the
courts to set aside findings of fact by statutory tribunals ... if "unsupported by
substantial" evidence would create difficulties. If such a rule were to become
meaningful, it would require bodies which at present conduct their proceedings
informally to have verbatim transcripts or to keep detailed notes of evidence. If
the administrative findings were made partly on the basis of inspection and
views, a body of super-inspectors would be needed.
78. Infra., note 77.
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"substantial evidence" on which a tribunal might base its finding of
fact? Is it not perhaps correct to suggest that in making such a
determination the court is involved in a weighing of the evidence
and injecting to a significant extent its own perception of the
matter. 79 Of course, it will be argued that when a supervisory court
considers and weighs the evidence in such matters it does so not
only for the purpose of determining whether there is truly
"substantial evidence" to support the tribunal's finding of fact,8 0
and, if it so finds, it stops short of rendering the decision it would
have given on the jurisdictional question of fact and thereby
preserves the distinction between a review and trial de novo.
But that theory, if it can be so labelled, is somewhat simplistic.
Certainly, it takes little cognizance of psychological and other
influences which direct the court from the outset to decide that there
is not substantial evidence to support the tribunal's findings. Of
course, it can be argued that, generally, in the application of any
rule of law to any factual situation, a court tends to or does in fact
reach the result which most reflects its own biases and appreciation
of justice. If that is so, then one can well imagine, despite the best
of intentions, the impossibility of attempting to made the subtle
distinctions and apply the type of restraint suggested in the
judgment of Dickson J. In the end then, despite the highest hopes
and arduous effort, the result achieved on "review" in this area
may well coincide with that which would have been decided on
"appeal". But since "law" cannot long be detained or deterred by
considerations of human weaknesses, we now turn to less ethereal
considerations.
Is there any prior judicial authority to support the proposition that
where jurisdictional questions are involved, the courts should avoid
substituting their opinion on the merits for that of the statutory
decision-maker? In his judgment, Dickson J. cites no cases.
79. At one point in his judgment Dickson J. commented: "In my opinion, the
adjudicator was correct in classifying what occurred as a discharge for disciplinary
reasons and . . . to proceed to . . . consider the merits of the matter."
80. But, in how many instances would a court make a different determination
(even where totally unrestricted) once it was totally satisfied there was substantial
evidence to support a particular determination? Also, from a seemingly different
perspective, in practice, if a court was of the opinion that there existed an
overwhelming preponderance of evidence to support a different finding, it would
not likely also find substantial evidence to support the tribunal's determination
knowing that "substantial evidence" would prevail over the "preponderance of
evidence."
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In the United States certainly, the distinctions between
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional matters have been virtually
abandoned as criteria for determining the scope of review. And
generally findings of law are held beyond review if they have a
rational basis and findings of fact are unreviewable if supported by
substantial evidence."" But even there, commentators8 2 have noted
that the courts will carry out a de novo review of jurisdictional
findings if and when they deem it necessary. And in England, even
decisions of licencing justices to grant discretionary exemptions
have been subjected to de novo review under the traditional
remedies. 83 Indeed, as a general rule, it may be said that English
courts will still normally review jurisdictional findings de novo
except where jurisdiction to determine a matter is conferred upon a
tribunal in rather "subjective" terms. 84 In Canada, too, unless the
jurisdiction of the tribunal is strongly dependent on matters within
the specialized knowledge of that decision-maker, 85 the courts have
generally been willing to substitute their opinion on the merits for
that of the tribunal on any type of jurisdictional question. 86 There is,
however, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Segal v.
The City of Montreal. 87 In Jacmain both de Grandpr6 and Pigeon
JJ. made reference to that case. In his judgment, the latter, as
already noted, said:
. .. it was noted in Segal . that where the jurisdiction [of an
administrative tribunal] depends upon contested facts, a superior
court will hestitate before reversing the inferior court'sfinding of
fact, and will only do so on "extremely strong" 88 grounds.
(Italics added.)
Assuming, therefore, that the decision in Segal provides a sufficient
81. See Schwartz and Wade, Legal Control of Government at 234
82. See, for e.g., H.W.R. Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: More
Reflections (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 266 at 232-9
83. See, for example, R. v. Butt, ex p. Brooke (1922) 38 T.L.R. 537. Compare
with Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
84. See, for example, Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and
Local Government, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1320; McEldowney v. Forde, [1971] A.C.
632, at 660-1 per Lord Diplock or Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF
(No. 2), [1972] 2 Q.B. 455 (C.A.)
85. See, perhaps, B.C. Prof. Engineers Assn. & Technical Employers' Union,
[1972] 3 W.W.R. 17 (B.C.)
86. See, for example, Re Registrar of Used Car Dealers & Salesmen, [1973] 1
O.R. 308 (C.A.)
87. [1931] S.C.R. 460
88. In Segal, supra, at 473, Martland J. used the expression "exceedingly
strong".
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basis to support the approach set out by Dickson J. in Jacmain with
reference to questions of jurisdictional fact, must we also accept the
view that on jurisdictional questions of law a tribunal's finding
should prevail if there is a "rational basis"?
While one cannot be certain, the "test", if it can be called that,
summarized by the phrase "rational basis" appears significantly
less onerous than the one set for allowing some latitude on
jurisdictional questions of fact. But assuming that assumption to be
incorrect, it appears to this writer that the rationale8 9 behind the
view that a tribunal's findings of fact should be overturned only in
the rarest of cases does not apply to decisions of law going to
jurisdiction especially where it is clear that Parliament did not
intend to make the tribunal the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction.
Surely, when it comes to making determinations as to the
applicability and meaning of statutes and other legal concepts, our
system requires more than merely a rational basis for deciding one
way or another. That such decisions should fall on those who may
not even be members of the legal profession and should go
unchallenged even though they do not fully accord with standards
usually adhered to in the regular courts appears repugnant in the
extreme, But again, all of what has been said here depends on what
is meant and understood by the term "rational basis". The "test"
it represents may indeed be extremely difficult to meet and may
require far more than merely a general level of sanity.
But let us leave the realms of speculation and consider the present
state of the law in light of the Supreme Court decision in Jacmain:
(1) First, as a preliminary point, there appears to be nothing in
Jacmain to disturb the ruling of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Cooper90 that ss.90 and 91 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act
does not authorize a greivance when the Public Service Commission
upholds a recommendation of the deputy head that the employee be
released.
(2) With reference to federal probationary employees, it appears
to be unanimously agreed that the employer cannot deprive such a
person of the benefit of the adjudicative process by labelling a
dismissal rejection for cause when it is in fact disciplinary.
89. In Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act (1976) 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 Laskin C.J.C.
used the term "rational" in the context of finding that the Court would be
unjustified in concluding that Parliament did not have a rational basis for regarding
the Anti-Inflation Act as a measure which was temporarily necessary to meet a
situation of economic crisis.
90. In Re Cooper, [1974] 2 F.C. 407
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(3) It appears unanimous also that it is the Adjudicator who must
determine, at first instance, whether what is in form rejection is in
substance disciplinary91
(4) And there appears to be nothing in Jacmain to disturb the
holding in Cutter 92 that when a challenge appears attacking the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal - here the adjudicator -
the tribunal must take a stand with reference to its jurisdiction even
though it cannot make an absolutely binding decision.
(5) But if there are grounds for rejection and if such grounds are
not based on bad faith, then the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to
hear the probationer's grievance. Certainly, in determining whether
or not the dismissal was in fact disciplinary in nature, the
Adjudicator cannot review the sufficiency of cause for rejection or
weigh the cause of rejection.
9 3
(6) As noted by Heald J. in the Federal Court of Appeal, the Bell
Canada decision seems to support the view (and such view appears
implicitly supported by the entire Supreme Court in Jacmain) that if
the matter is rejection for cause, then, as presently worded, the
Public Service Staff Relations Act cannot be said to give the
Adjudicator jurisdiction.
(7) However, as Fardella94 indicates, if the matter is in fact
disciplinary in nature, the adjudicator possesses jurisdiction even in
cases involving probationary workers.
(8) In using the Jacmain decision to discem the role of the
Federal Court of Appeal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the
Federal Court Act, one must proceed cautiously. As already
mentioned, there is some significant dicta in the case. For example,
in his judgment, Dickson J. characterized s.28(1) (c) as an
"addition to the common law". And given the assertion of de
Grandpr6 J. that he accepted the adjudicator's finding of fact and
considered only his conclusion in law, then the following comment
of His Lordship may also have to fall into the category of obiter:
". .. when there is contradictory evidence on the facts relating to a
question of jurisdiction, appeal tribunals are not bound by the limits
imposed by s.28(l) (c) [of the Federal Court Act.]"
91. In their judgments both Pigeon and Dickson JJ. are fairly explicit. de
Grandpr6, in his judgment, seems to accept that implicitly
92. Supra.
93. In the view of Dickson J., however, it does not necessarily follow that simply
because there lurked in the background some cause to justify rejection that the
termination must be rejection and not a disciplinary discharge.
94. Supra.
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More generally, it may be said that since de Grandpr6 J. focused
largely on the limits imposed on the adjudicator, his express
remarks as to the review role of the Court of Appeal might be
expected to be both sparse and nebulous. However, if we accept the
view at least implicitly expressed by Dickson J. in his judgment that
the Court of Appeal conducted a trial de novo on a factual issue (and
thereby erred) and if we accept the view that de Grandpr6 J. cited
with concurrence a sufficient portion of the judgment of Heald J. in
the Court below which makes it reasonably clear that the Court of
Appeal conducted a de novo "review", then it can also be said that
Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 would endorse "review" of an
administrative tribunal's jurisdictional findings as if it were an
appeal. Whether that is really the case or whether future courts
would accept that kind of reasoning appears dubious. Furthermore,
even if it might be said that de Grandpr6 J. endorsed the proposition
that a court is not restricted merely to a limited review on
jurisdictional findings made by inferior tribunals, the judgments of
Dickson and Pigeon JJ. together are sufficient to overrule the
former's holding. That is, of course, if one is prepared to find
sufficient concurrence between the latter two Justices. With
reference to findings of fact going to jurisdiction and only with
reference to them, it will be recalled that Pigeon J. approved of
Segal in that a superior court should hesitate before reviewing the
inferior court's findings and do so only on extremely strong
grounds. Whether or not, on the basis of that authority, he would
restrict the review court from conducting a trial de novo on such
factual issues is arguable and whether such restrictions would apply
in all cases is another moot point. Dickson J., it will be recalled,
would seemingly restrict the Court of Appeal in all cases to a
"review" role in such matters and would insist that the review court
allow some latitude in its surevillance.
In conclusion, permit this brief prophetic remark: As it relates to
the role or function of the Court of Appeal in its "review" of
jurisdictional findings made by administrative tribunals, the
Jacmain case will hardly be seen as definitive and, indeed, will
breed much confusion and new litigation on point.
